Last year, two teams of researchers funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) succeeded in genetically modifying the H5N1 avian flu virus. The modified virus is capable of respiratory transmission between ferrets, suggesting that it would also be transmittable between humans and potentially capable of causing a “pandemic of disastrous proportions” with mortality rates exceeding 50%.
The central controversy arose around attempts to prevent publication of the research findings, which some considered a “blueprint for bioterrorism”. The U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) met to discuss the issue and adopt a solution that would both protect national security and be consistent with scientific freedom and the First Amendment. While the NSABB recommended redacting details from the paper, the international community came to a different conclusion. At a meeting convened at the World Health Organization in Geneva, international experts felt that the papers should be published in full.
On the domestic plane, preventing publication of scientific research raises issues of free speech and the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has consistently read the First Amendment broadly, as evidenced by the landmark Pentagon Papers case. In New York Times v. United States, the government sought to prevent the New York Times from publishing a top secret study on the U.S.’s policy in Vietnam. This marked the first time that the federal government sued the press to prevent it from disclosing information for reasons of national security. The Supreme Court recognized that there was a “heavy presumption against” restraints on the press, and found that the government did not meet this burden.
Even in instances – as with the H5N1 research – where the U.S. government has funded research, this does not give it the power to censor publication. In Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. University v. Sullivan, the Court ruled that federally funded scientific research should not be subject to prior restraint. That is, the government may choose whether or not to fund research, but if it chooses to fund a certain study, it may not restrain the dissemination of findings from that research without a compelling state interest.
Although First Amendment jurisprudence is strong, freedom of speech does not extend to every situation. The Court ruled in Chaplinisky v. New Hampshire that certain utterances may be of such low value “that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” Since New York Times v. United States, courts have found themselves judging cases in which it is necessary to balance the value of free speech against other interests, such as security. In 1979, the Court in United States v. Progressive, Inc. recognized that “First Amendment rights are not absolute,” and enjoined the press from publishing an article with technical details on constructing a hydrogen bomb. The Court ruled that the threat to national security met the standard established in New York Times v. United States.
In the case of the H5N1 research, a redacted publication may survive a First Amendment challenge under the reasoning of the court in Progressive. In both instances, free speech must be balanced against the potential threat to life and security. The government could evoke the war on terror to argue that heightened restraints on speech are necessary when it comes to issues of biosecurity during wartime.
Another possible solution to the H5N1 controversy is for Congress to legislate in this domain. One of the Supreme Court’s main reservations in New York Times v. United States was that the judges did not want to legislate from the bench; they saw this as an issue of separation of powers. In recent years, Congress has considered expanding legislation to protect national security over freedom of the press. After the upheaval caused by Wikileaks, the Securing Human Intelligence and Enforcing Lawful Dissemination (SHIELD) Act was introduced in Congress. This proposed legislation would amend the Espionage Act, providing greater protection for classified government information.
Unfortunately, as the H5N1 controversy has shown, problems relating to security and free speech do not end with domestic law. The two researchers who led the H5N1 study were from universities in the U.S. and the Netherlands, and the international community and the World Health Organization have already become heavily involved. Even if redacting the articles would survive a First Amendment challenge in the U.S., these efforts would be fruitless if other countries chose to publish the data in science journals abroad. With increasing international collaboration in scientific research and greater security risks posed by research findings, it may soon become necessary to create a set of international standards for biosecurity.
One major problem with international standards to suppress speech in the interests of security is determining who decides when these standards have been met. In the case of the H5N1 research, would the U.S. and the Netherlands be the sole decision makers? This seems certain to displease other nations who have an interest in the sensitive information or in voicing their opinions. On the other hand, if all nations had a say in weighing the benefits of publication against security interests, then the risk of sensitive information getting out could grow even greater.
Threats to biosecurity like the H5N1 research will continue to present themselves in the years to come, and political leaders should seek to address these issues both domestically and internationally. While First Amendment jurisprudence may pose an obstacle to preventing the dissemination of dangerous information, a coordinated effort on the international level is also necessary. With clear standards for undertaking research and withholding sensitive findings from the press, threats to biosecurity may be contained without prejudice to scientific freedom.